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ABSTRACT 
 
Multi criteria methods for supporting decision-making procedures are widely 
used in sustainability assessment.  One of the most important steps in 
decision-making procedures is the evaluation of policy options or alternatives 
in order to find a hierarchy of option choices. Utility function value distributions 
are often constructed for the range of indicators for the options to be 
assessed. This distribution can be presented as an impact matrix stacked with 
indicator weights to reflect the relative importance of different indicators for 
the decision-maker. Solving rules are then introduced to integrate all 
individual indicator evaluations into a single integral utility estimation. These 
are often based on the averaging procedures, one of the simplest being 
arithmetic averaging.  Whilst averaging rules are very attractive to decision 
makers due to their simplicity and logical transparency, using averaging as 
the first step of the decision-making procedures can significantly reduce the 
discrimination of the options, especially if there are counteractive individual 
indicator estimations.  
 
This paper proposes a method to evaluate and overcome this loss of 
discrimination. The paper explains the basis of a discriminatory analysis 
approach to sustainability assessment demonstrates its application through 
the use of illustrative data and describes its application to an existing case 
study where researchers had applied a number of multi criteria analysis tools. 
It was concluded that the discriminatory analysis provided a useful addition to 
the decision-makers toolbox as it provided a means of assessment of the 
validity of the application of the simple arithmetic averaging technique.  
 
Key Words:  Multi-criteria decision making tools; sustainability metrics and 
indicators 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Multicriteria methods for supporting of decision-making procedures have 
found an increasing recognition and widespread use. Such methods are 
capable of dealing with the multiple dimensions of evaluation problems (e.g. 
social, cultural, ecological, technological, institutional, etc.) and give due 
attention to conflicts among stakeholders involved. In general, the aim of 
these methods is to combine assessment methods with judgement methods 
and to offer a solid analytical basis for modern decision analysis (Nijkamp et 
al, 1990).  One of the most important steps in decision-making procedures is 
the estimation of policy options or alternatives in order to find a hierarchy 
option choices. In this step the distribution jiu ,  of utility function values, 
versus policy options (i) and indicators (j) are frequently served as input for 
the evaluating processes. This distribution can be presented as an impact 
matrix stacked with indicator weights to reflect the relative importance of the 
indicators for the decision-makers.  
 
A solving rule should then be introduced to integrate all individual indicator 
evaluations into a single integral utility estimation, which allows discrimination 
and ranking of the policy options. The solving rules are often based on the 
averaging procedures, one of the simplest being just arithmetic averaging: 
  
j
jiji uwPOU , ,                                                                                          (1) 
where  iPOU  is integral utility of policy option iPO  and jiu ,  is a utility 
function value for this policy option with respect to the indicator jI . 
 
The averaging solving rules are very attractive for the decision makers 
through their simplicity and logical transparency. On the other hand, 
averaging as the first step of the decision-making procedures can significantly 
reduce the discrimination of the policy options, especially if there are 
counteractive individual indicator estimations. This can create significant 
instability of the policy option ranking even under small perturbations of the 
impact matrix. 
 
It is proposed that an appropriate way to overcome this difficulty is to initially 
evaluate the data set using a form of discrimination analysis thereby enabling 
an assessment to be made of the subsequent validity of data analysis using a 
simple arithmetic averaging technique, i.e. to change the usual order of multi 
criteria assessment of “estimating – discriminating – ranking” to the following 
one “discriminating – estimating – ranking”. Hereafter the new Discriminative 
Multi Attribute Ranking Technique (DISMART) is briefly described. 
 
2.  PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
Consider the weighted utility evaluation variance, 
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where jijji uwb ,,  , to be suitable measure of indicator individual 
discriminative ability. The total discriminative ability totD  of all indicators can 
be defined as a sum of individual discriminative abilities. 
 

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jtot ID
1
var .                                                                                                 (4) 
To provide for the best discrimination of the policy options on the base of all 
indicator discriminative abilities the following policy option discriminator iPCS  
can be introduced as linear transformation of indicator evaluations 



m
j
jjii abPCS
1
, ,                                                                                                 (5) 
Where ja  are unknown coefficients, which should be normalised 
12 
j
ja ,                                                                                                               (6) 
and provide for the largest covariance of discriminator 
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There should be found the set of coefficients  ja , which defines the 
discrimination scale where policy options are distributed in accordance to (5). 
 
3. PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
 
The problem (equations 5, 6 and 7) is exactly the same as it is considered in 
the frames of Principal Component Analysis (PCA).  PCA is often used to 
reduce the dimension of a data set, replacing a large number of correlated 
variables with a smaller number of orthogonal variables that still contain most 
of the information in the original data set. PCA does not have an underlying 
statistical model, so it is just a simple mathematical technique. 
 
According to PCA there are, in general, n  sets of coefficients 
        njjj aaa ,,, 21  , which are eigenvectors of variance-covariance matrix 
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to be correspondent to the eigenvalues 021  n  . These sets 
have variances equal to the correspondent eigenvalues; they are uncorrelated 
and usually called as principal components (PC’s). The sum of eigenvalues 
equals to the total discriminative ability totD  of indicators. Policy option 
discriminator 
   

j
s
jji
s
i abPCS , ,                                                                                        (10) 
correspondent to the s -th PC, is s -th principal component score (PCS) for 
the i -th policy option. The value 
tot
s
s
D

 .                                                                                              (11) 
is relative variance of the s -th principal component (PCRV). 
 
It can be concluded that PC’s provides for the multicriteria assessment by 
several (not more than number of indicators to be used) orthogonal 
discrimination scales where policy options are ordered independently by 
PCS’s. It’s worth to point out that PCA discrimination ordering can’t be 
considered directly as ranking ordering because, inter alia, if set 
  sja  is s -th 
PC then set 
  sja  is also PC correspondent to the same eigenvalue s . 
That means the next stage of assessment is required to interpret PCA 
discrimination scales in order to find the ranking one. Some of modalities for 
the PCA interpretation in the frames of multicriteria assessment of policy 
options are illustrated by the following two case studies. 
 
 
3.  CASE SUDIES 
 
3.1 Case Study 1.  Model examples 
 
 
Case Study 1 uses illustrative data to demonstrate the application of 
DISMART. Consider four extreme distributions of weighted utility function, 
reflecting different kinds of individual indicator interactions, which are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2.  The results of arithmetic averaging (equation 1) 
and policy option ranking are presented in Table 3.  It is clear from these 
figures that, except indicator agreement, policy options are poorly 
discriminated by the averaging thus ranking seems to be not reliable at least 
for the case of indicator disagreement.  
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Policy 
options 
Indicators 
High Level of Agreement 
(HLA) 
Indicators 
Moderate Level of 
Agreement 
(MLA) 
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 
PO1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
PO2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
PO3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
PO4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
PO5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Table 1: High and Moderate levels of agreement 
 
Policy 
Options 
Indicators 
Disagreement as conflict 
(DAC) 
Indicators 
Disagreement as 
discordance 
(DAD) 
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 
PO1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 
PO2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 
PO3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 
PO4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.5 
PO5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.5 
Table 2: Disagreement 
 
Policy 
options 
Indicator interactions 
HLA MLA DC DD 
 POU
 
Rank  POU
 
Rank  POU  Rank  POU
 
Rank 
PO1 0.1 5 0.23 5 0.5 Undefined 0.5 Undefined 
PO2 0.3 4 0.25 4 0.5 Undefined 0.5 Undefined 
PO3 0.5 3 0.5 3 0.5 Undefined 0.5 Undefined 
PO4 0.7 2 0.63 2 0.5 Undefined 0.5 Undefined 
PO5 0.9 1 0.77 1 0.5 Undefined 0.5 Undefined 
Table 3: Policy option average utility estimations and ranking 
 
Table 4 contains policy option discriminations of the first and second PCS’s 
showing its significantly larger discrimination ability. Correspondent principal 
component relative variances are listed in the last row. According to these 
data the first PC, having PCRV equals to 1, totally describes policy option 
evaluation variability for the cases of indicator agreement and disagreement 
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as conflict. In all cases policy options are well discriminated. If some kind of 
disagreement appears among indicator evaluations then values with opposite 
signs appear in the first PCS’s. The stronger disagreement the more 
comparable extreme negative and positive First PCS’s on absolute value 
becomes. 
 
Policy 
options 
Indicator interactions 
HLA MLA DC DD 
First 
PCS’s 
Second 
PCS’s 
First 
PCS’s 
Second 
PCS’s 
First 
PCS’s 
Second 
PCS’s 
First 
PCS’s 
Second 
PCS’s 
PO1 0.245 0 -0.163 0.525 -0.98 0.989 -0.096 -0.096 
PO2 0.735 0 0.327 0.525 -0.49 0.989 0.474 0.474 
PO3 1.225 0 0.816 0.525 0 0.989 0.388 0.388 
PO4 1.715 0 1.306 0.525 0.49 0.989 -0.234 -0.234 
PO5 2.205 0 1.796 0.525 0.98 0.989 -0.533 -0.533 
  
PCRV 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.362 0.362 
Table 4: Policy option PCS estimations 
 
If there is high or moderate level of agreement existing in the indicator 
evaluations then the First PCRV takes the main part of the total discriminative 
ability and the first discrimination scale can be easily converted into the 
ranking scale by appropriate choice of direction “from bad to good”. The 
obvious choice can be made, for instance, by comparing the policy option 
distributions along discrimination scales and policy option ranking by the 
average utility estimations (Table 4) that leads to the same ranking. 
 
The disagreement conditions, when extreme negative and positive First 
PCS’s have the same order of magnitude on absolute value, do not allow 
converting of the first discrimination scale into the ranking one. Under 
conditions of disagreement as conflict, when the First PCRV also takes the 
main part of the total discriminative ability, the first PCS’s clearly signify the 
policy options, which are the subject of conflict, so the moderate decision 
could be proposed as compromise (for instance, policy option that 
corresponds to the median of the first PCS’s distribution) or some kind of 
controlled dialogue could be initiated between stakeholders in order to soften 
detected conflict. If the median concept for compromise is acceptable then 
PO3 will be taken as the suitable. 
 
Under conditions of disagreement as discordance, when the total 
discriminative ability more or less equally distributed between PC’s, one can 
conclude that several more or less independent conflicts exist between 
indicator estimations. The absence of concordance does not allow taking any 
reliable decision. The possible way out is to reconsider the set of indicators or 
to initiate dialogue between stakeholders. 
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3.2 Case Study 2 - Escape from the sewer system of domestic sanitary 
waste 
The disposal of domestic sanitary solids using the WC as a “rubbish bin” is 
habitual in the UK and stems from the historical link associating health risks 
with human waste (hygiene). A multi-disciplinary comprehensive scientific 
study has been carried out in Scotland to consider the concept of 
sustainability for this issue and to address the three main component areas: 
economy, environment and society (Ashley et al., 2005). The following 
indicators (Table 5) and policy options (Table 6) were considered and three 
methodologies of multi criteria assessment were implemented, namely 
PROMETHEE, ELECTRE software packages and the Simple Multi-attribute 
Rating Technique (SMART).   
 
    Indicators Code 
Economic  
1. Capital costs CC 
2. Operational costs OC 
3. Maintenance cost MC 
4. Financial risk exposure FRE 
Social  
5. Acceptability (to Stakeholders) AcSt 
6. Perceived impact on the Environment PIE 
7. Participation and responsibility PaRe 
Environmental  
8. Sanitary waste escape SWE 
9. (Primary) Energy use EnUs 
10. Impact on air – CO2 IoAC 
11. Impact on air – NOx IoAN 
12. Impact on air – SO4 IoAS 
13. CSO discharge CSOD 
Technical  
14. Sanitary waste transport SWT 
15. Risk of failure RoF 
16. Flexibility and Adaptability FIAd 
Table 5: Indicators 
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.Policy Options Code 
Install 6mm screens on overflows at waste-water 
treatment plants 
In6S 
“Think before you flush” (TBYF) campaigns TDYF 
Install flow storage InSt 
Retrofit storm water source control RSSC 
Sewer rehabilitation SeRe 
Retrofit outlet chokes on existing WCs and 
introduce these to new developments 
ROC 
Table 6: Policy options 
 
The weightings shown in Table 7 and utility function values shown in Table 8 
were used in the three methods of analysis to rank the policy options and to 
verify its stability in sensitivity testing.  The results of this analysis from the 
case study report are shown in Table 9.   
 
Code of 
indicator 
Weight 
Normal  Inverted Equal 
1. CC 10.5 2.5 6.25 
2. OC 10.5 2.5 6.25 
3. MC 10.5 2.5 6.25 
4. FRE 3.5 7.5 6.25 
5. AcSt 4.5 10.5 6.25 
6. PIE 7.5 7 6.25 
7. PaRe 3 17.5 6.25 
8. SWE 8 2 6.25 
9. EnUs 3.5 4 6.25 
10. IoAC 3.5 4 6.25 
11. IoAN 3.5 4 6.25 
12. IoAS 3.5 4 6.25 
13. CSOD 8 2 6.25 
14. SWT 4 12.5 6.25 
15. RoF 9 6 6.25 
16. FIAd 7 10.5 6.25 
Table 7: Variants of weighting 
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Indicator 
Code  
Policy Option Code 
In6S TBYF InSt RSSC SeRE ROC 
1. CC 45 80 49 95 65 70 
2. OC 85 80 100 100 100 100 
3. MC 35 100 80 100 100 75 
4. FRE 70 100 0 100 100 0 
5. AcSt 69 86 63 52 89 66 
6. PIE 61 78 59 58 72 67 
7. PaRe 0 100 0 100 0 100 
8. SWE 95 75 60 40 50 90 
9. EnUs 25 95 0 30 90 50 
10. IoAC 80 95 70 85 90 95 
11. IoAN 85 100 20 95 90 70 
12. IoAS 60 95 10 85 90 80 
13. CSOD 10 10 50 25 30 15 
14. SWT 100 100 50 50 0 50 
15. RoF 100 25 85 60 85 0 
16. FIAd 60 60 0 100 0 0 
Table 8: Utility function values 
 
Policy 
Option 
PROMETHEE ELECTRE SMART 
Normal Inverse Equal Normal Inverse Equal Normal Inverse Equal 
In6S 5 5 5 6 =4 5 4 3 4 
TBYF 1 1 1 2 1 =1 1 1 1 
InSt 6 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 
RSSC 3 2 3 =3 3 =3 2 2 2 
SeRe 2 3 2 1 2 =1 3 5 3 
ROC 4 4 4 =3 4 =3 5 4 5 
Table 9: Initial case study policy option ranking  
 
Overall consideration of the results would indicate that the TBYF option 
dominates the top rankings, followed by SeRe (sewer rehabilitation) and then 
the RSSC (retrofit source control).  The other three options are quite 
consistently placed in the final three positions. There would appear to be a 
reasonable degree of consistency between the outranking methods 
(PROMETHEE and ELECTRE) but there is less consistency between these 
methods and the SMART analysis.  This is likely to be due to the influence of 
trade-offs in the smart analysis between positive and less positive scores for 
individual criteria within the analysis.  Whilst the three techniques gave 
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SIMULATED SMART SCORES 
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broadly similar results in terms of the policy option rankings, the rankings 
were found to be largely insensitive to changes in weightings giving rise to 
concerns about the discriminative abilities of the techniques. 
 
Further assessment of the discriminative ability of the SMART analysis was 
undertaken in the initial case study using the normal weightings in Table 7 
using Monte Carlo simulation.  Deterministic estimates of the scores for 
criteria and there weightings were replaced by probability distributions.  In the 
absences of sufficient data to allow the precise nature of the probability 
distributions to be determined, truncated normal distributions were used.  
Truncation was applied to prevent scores less than 0 or greater than 100 
being used and the standards deviations of the distributions were selected to 
reflect estimates of the accuracy of the assessment of the scoring and 
weighting of the criteria. The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 1.   
The overlap between the pairs of distributions e.g. TBYF and RSSC may 
suggest that both policy options are similar in terms of their sustainability, but 
this may again illustrate a lack of discrimination in the SMART methodology 
arising from the trade-offs. 
Figure 1: Simulated smart scores 
 
To address this question, the data in tables 7 and 8 were analysed for this 
paper using the DISMART approach and the results are shown in Tables 10 
and 11.  The first PCS’s are shown in Table 10. The first PCS orders the 
policy options on the maximum discrimination scale. Under the both inverted 
and equal weighting PCS’s have the same sign (positive for the equal and 
negative for the inverted weighting). Then it can be taken that there are no 
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disagreement indicator evaluations and discrimination scale can be 
transformed to the ranking scale by appropriate choice of direction for the 
rank descending: positive for the PCS of equal weight and negative for the 
PCS of inverted weight. The correspondent ranks are listed in Table 10.  
 
If the normal weights are used then the first PCS’s change sign that can be 
explained by the presence of moderate agreement because the absolute 
value of negative PCS is much smaller then largest positive. Then the 
discrimination scale can be also transformed to the ranking scale by the same 
choice of direction for the rank descending as it was done for the equal 
weighting. 
 
Policy 
Option 
Code 
First PCS 
Normal weight Inverted weight Equal weight 
TBYF 1044 -2107 1534 
RSSC 933.9 -2042 1367 
ROC 796.9 -1792 953.5 
SeRe 405.1 -19.0 852.9 
In6S 15.5 -357,6 648.9 
InSt -6.7 -32,0 75.8 
Table 10: The first PCS under different weighting 
 
 
Policy 
Option 
DISMART 
Normal Inverse Equal 
TBYF 1 1 1 
RSSC 2 2 2 
ROC 3 3 3 
SeRe 4 6 4 
In6S 5 4 5 
InSt 6 5 6 
Table 11: DISMART policy option ranking 
 
The correspondent distributions of eigenvalues are shown on Figures 2, 3 and 
4. From these figures it is clear that first PC takes more than 40% of the total 
discriminative ability of all indicators which supports ranking based on the first 
principle component. 
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Figure 2: PCRV distribution under the normal weighting 
 
Figure 3: PCRV distribution under the inverted weighting 
 
Figure 4: PCRV distribution under the equal weighting 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The DISMART analysis demonstrates adequate discrimination between the 
policy options in the initial case study analysis, which provides evidence that 
the ranking obtained from the SMART analysis were appropriate.  
Furthermore, the DISMART analysis demonstrates that the sensitivity testing 
in the initial case study discriminated adequately options when the weightings 
were changed which indicates that the lack of sensitivity in the ranking of the 
options is a true reflection of their relative sustainability and not a result of 
known methodological limitations of SMART analysis. 
 
Consequently DISMART provides a useful addition to the decision-makers 
toolkit.  Simple such as SMART are very attractive to decision makers due to 
their simplicity and logical transparency, and have been shown in Case Study 
2 and by other researchers to provide  similar results to more complex 
mathematical methods such as ELECTRE.  However, it is known that 
averaging can significantly reduce the discrimination of the options, especially 
if there are counteractive individual indicator estimations.  The use of 
DISMART prior to a Smart analysis will enable the decision maker to assess 
the influence of counteractive individual indicators within a data set thereby 
providing guidance on the appropriateness of a simple  arithmetic averaging 
technique. 
 
The principle of maximum discrimination of policy options before the multi 
criteria estimations leads to more information regarding the subsequent 
ranking of policy options. DISMART enables: 
 Maximum discrimination of policy before assessment therefore taking 
into account all “viewpoints” of individual evaluations (indicators). 
 Detection and measurement of the level of agreement. 
 The introduction of discrimination scales for the scoring and ranking of 
policy options when agreement exists between indicator estimations. 
 Detection of situations when disagreement as conflict exists and to 
propose the compromised decisions. 
 Detection of situations when disagreement as discordance exists. 
 
Future research will be carried out comparing the sensitivity analysis of 
DISMART results to other multi-criteria ranking approaches.  
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